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THE PROCESS OF OUTLAWRY IN NEW YORK:
A STUDY OF THE SELECTIVE RECEPTION OF ENGLISH LAW
MARx DEWoL

E IowE

It has been said that "one of the chief difficulties confronting a student of
our legal history is that the whole subject of the reception of English law,
both common and statutory, was not thought out in any consistent way, but
was left unsettled and in thd air."' It is doubtless true that during the colonial
period the selective reception and discriminating rejection of English law
had, in large part, been the product of empiricism, and that coherent theory
had done little to clarify the nature of the process.2 Some of the colonies,
however, were aware of the importance of the problem. The preamble to
an act of the Provincial Assembly of South Carolina of 1712 recited that
"many of the -statute laws of the Kingdom of England or South Britain,
by reason of the different way of agriculture and the differing productions
of the earth of this Province from that of England, are altogether useless,
and many others, (which otherwise are very good) either by reason of their
limitation to particular places, or because in themselves they are only executive by such nominal officers as are not in or suitable for the Constitution
of this Government, are thereby become impracticable here."s The legislature, recognizing this situation, re-enacted one hundred and sixty-seven
British statutes which, upon the recommendation of Chief Justice Nicholas
Trott, were found to be applicable to the condition of the colony. 4 The
tenth section of the act by which these laws were received within the
colony provided that "all the statute laws of the Kingdom of England
which are not enumerated and made of force in this Province by this act...
are hereby declared impracticable in this Province."'5 Three years later the
legislature of North Carolina made a similar, though far less thorough,
effort to accomplish the same purpose, and in general descriptive terms listed
the British statutes which were to be treated as operative in the Province. 6
'Cardozo, C. J., in Beers v. Hotchkiss, 256 N. Y. 41, 54; 175 N. E. 506 (1931).
'See REIxNCH, The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies in 1
SELEcT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN. LEGAL HISTORY (1907) 367; Pope, English Cornmon Law in the United States (1910) 24 HARv. L. REV. 6; Dale, The Adoption of the
Common Law by the American Colonies (1882) 21 Am. L. RG. (N. s.) 554; MoRmIs,
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAx LAW (1930).
'Stat. No. 322, 2 Statutes at Large of South Carolina, p. 401.
'Ibid. A valuable discussion of this legislation may be found in McCRADY, HISTORY
OF SOUTH CAROLINA UNDER THE PROPRIETARY GOVERNMENT, 1670-1719 (1897) pp. 247-

248, 517 et se .
BIB.
'Laws of North Carolina, 1715, Ch. 31, Sec. 7. This act provided that "all statute

Laws of England, made for maintaining the Queen's Royal Prerogative, and the

Security of her Royal Person, and Succession of the Crown, and all such Laws made
for the Establishment of the Church, and the Laws made for the Indulgence of
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In other colonies where no conscious effort to specify the operative English statutes was made, the process of reception was summarized by generalizations. 7 In 1774, Governor Tryon of the Province of New York reported
to the King that "the common law of England is considered as the fundamental law of the Province, and it is the received doctrine that all the
statutes (not local in their nature, and which can be fitly applied to the
circumstances of the Colony) enacted before the Province had a legislature,
are binding on the Colony .
".8.."I
Rebellious Americans, though they might
find the general formula adequate, not surprisingly changed the emphasis
of its implications. In the Declaration of Civil Rights of the Continental
Congress it was asserted that "the respective colonies are entitled to the
common law of England . . . [and] to the benefit of such English statutes

as existed at the time of their colonization; and which they have, by experience, respectively found to be applicable to their several local and other
circumstances." 9
Such generalizations as these survived the revolution and acquired constitutional dignity. The thirty-fifth article of the New York Constitution of
1777, as finally adopted, provided that "such parts of the common law of
England, and of the statute law of England and Great Britain, and of the
acts of the legislature of the Colony of New York, as together did form
the law of the said colony on the nineteenth of April in the year of
our Lord one thousand, seven hundred and seventy-five, shall be and continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations and provisions as
the legislature of this State shall, from time to time, make concerning the
same."10 The sweeping simplicity of this language inevitably concealed important and difficult questions,--just those questions which during the
colonial period had been left "unsettled and in the air". What portion of the
Protestant Dissenters, and all Laws providing for the Privilege of the People, and
Security of Trade; as also, all Statute Laws made for limitation of Actions, and
preventing of vexatious Law Suits, and for preventing Immorality and Fraud, and
confirming Inheritances and Titles of Land, are and shall be in Force here, although
this Province, or the plantations in general, are not therein named".
'We are not here concerned with the analogous though essentially dissimilar problem
of determining which British statutes, enacted after the foundation of the colonies,
were there applicable. That that problem was one of which the colonists were aware
is evidenced by such legislation as that of New York in 1767 by which a series of
recent English statutes were extended to the province. 4 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORKC,
953 (Ch. 1327).
11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF NEW YORE (1849) 752, 754.
'1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (W. C. Ford ed. 1904) 69.
"As originally introduced in the convention the clause provided for the reception of
the common law in toto. It provided that "the Common Law of England and so much
of the Statute Law of England and Great Britain as have heretofore been adopted in
practice in this State . . . shall until altered or repealed by a future Legislature of
this State continue to operate and be of force and effect". The changes made in the
final draft were adopted from an amendment offered by Robert Yates. 1 LINCOLN'S
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YoRx (1906) 540-541.
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common law, and precisely which statutes had formed part of the colonial
law on April 19, 1775? Who was to decide these issues, the legislature, the
courts, or the legal scholars of the future?
The New York legislature in 1786 endeavored to answer certain of these
questions. The preamble to an act of that year recited that "such of the
said [English] statutes as have been generally supposed to extend to the
late Colony, and to this State, are contained in a great number of volumes;
and those statutes . .. are conceived in a stile and language improper to
appear in the statute books of this state."" Because it was deemed desirable that some definition of the operative British statutes should be made,
and that language and style should be adapted to local needs and tastes, it
was enacted that Samuel Jones' 2 and Richard Varick,' 5 Esquires, should
"reduce into proper form under certain heads or titles of bills all the said
statutes ...and lay 'the same bills before the legislature ...to the intent
that when the same shall be completed ... none of the statutes of England
4
or of Great Britain shall operate or be considered as laws of this State."'
The two men were also to submit for re-enactment any colonial acts which
were believed to have been in force when the revolution started. Finally
they were to publish these re-enacted laws, together with such additional
statutes as might in the interval be passed by the legislature.' 5 Although
the Jones and Varick revision was, not published until 1789, the heaviest
portion of their work was apparently performed within the allotted time of
two years. During the sessions of 1787 and 1788 many English statutes
were adopted by the legislature, 16 and in 1788 it was enacted that after
the first of May, 1789, "none of the statutes of England or of Great Britain
shall operate or be considered as laws of the State."'17 This legislative
elimination of English statutory law was made permanent by the second state
constitution of 1821.18
The work of Jones and Varick was not unparalleled. We have seen that
'1786 N. Y. Laws, c. 35.

'See 10 DIcTIONARY
'See 19 DIcTioNAnY

OF AMERICAx BIOGRAPHY (1933)
OF AmERiCAw BIOGRAPHY (1936)

197.
226.

'N.Y. Laws 1786, c. 35, Sec. 1.
'Ibid. Section 2.
"In Harmon v. Peats Co., 216 App. Div. 368, 214 N. Y. Supp. 353 (1926), reversed
on other grounds, 243 N. Y. 473, 154 N. E. 314 (1926), it was held that the English
Statute of Frauds, which had constituted part of the common law of the Province,
had not, for conflict of laws purposes, become statutory law by its specific re-enactment
on the recommendation of Jones and Varick in 1787. Cf. Burns Mortgage Co., v.
Fried, 292 U. S.487, 54 Sup. Ct. 813, 78 L. ed. 1380 (1934).
'N. Y. Laws 1788, c. 46, Sec. 37.
uBy Section 13 of Article Seven of the Constitution of 1821 it was provided that
"such parts of the common law and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of
New York as together did form the law of the said colony on the nineteenth day of
April one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five . . . and such acts of the legislature
of this state as are now in force shall be and continue the law of this state . . . ." It
is, of course, noticeable that this section nowhere mentions the statutory law of England.
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South and North Carolina during the colonial period had each endeavored
to accomplish the same purpose. With political independence achieved it
was natural that renewed attempts to limit and define the operative British
statutes should be made. In 1776 the Virginia Assembly appointed a commission of five, among whom was Thomas Jefferson, whose duty it was to
submit to the legislature for revision and enactment such statutes, British
and local, as were believed to be desirable.' 9 Three of the commissioners
20
carried out the task, and in 1779 submitted the laws which they had chosen.
During the sessions of 1785 and 1786 the most important of the bills were
enacted, but their passage was spasmodic, and in 1786 it was necessary to
appoint a special committee to consider those bills which had not yet been
enacted into law. 21 In North Carolina there was published in 1792, at the
request of the legislature, a volume of those English statutes which were
believed to have been operative there prior to the revolution. 22 The preface
to this volume expressed vividly the American desire to destroy, so far as
possible, the British legal inheritance. The day was fondly anticipated when
the people would "shake off this last seeming badge, and mortifying memento" of dependence on England.m The process of statutory specification continued into the nineteenth century. In 1807 the legislature of Pennsylvania
requested the judges of the Supreme Court to determine which English statutes were then in force.2 4 The judges' report was presented to the legislature in the following year, and was accompanied by a revealing introductory explanation of the character of the work which had been done.2

"9 HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE 175. The preamble contains an interesting recital
of the reasons for the legislation: "Whereas on the late change which hath of
necessity been introduced into the form of government in this country it is become
also necessary to make corresponding changes in the laws heretofore in force, many
of which are inapplicable to the powers of government now organized, others are
founded on principles heterogeneous to the republican spirit, others which, long before
such change, had been oppressive to the people, could yet never be repealed while the
regal power continued, and others, having taken their origin while our ancestors remained in Britain, are not so well adapted to our present circumstances of time and
place, and it is also necessary to introduce certain other laws, which, though proved
by the experience of other states to be friendly to liberty and the rights of mankind,
we have not heretofore been permitted to adopt . .. .
'See 12 HENING, preface. Also see Jefferson's account of the commission's work in

his Autobiography, (P. L. Ford ed. 1914) p. 66 et seq. The three revisers were
Jefferson, George Wythe, and Edmund Pendleton. George Mason and Thomas L. Lee,

not being lawyers, excused themselves from taking part in preparing the revision.

Ibid. p. 68.
'12 HENING, 409.
"FRANcIs-XAviER MARTIN, COLLECTION OF THE STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF
ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA (1792).

Ibid. p. iv.
'8 STATUTES

AT LARGE OF PA. p. 418. (Ch. 1831).
"The report is reprinted in an appendix to 3 BINxxy at "p.593. The Pennsylvania
judges, like the New York legislators, found the language of the ancient British
statutes unsatisfactory for American purposes. "In perusing the statutes referred to
in the report, the legislature will perceive, that in many of them the language is un'couth, and unsuited to our present form of government." Id. at p. 597. Jefferson in
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Shortly after the revolution a similar program of reception was instituted
in Maryland. 26 It finally'bore fruit in 1811 in the publication by Chancellor
Kilty of a volume of British statutes considered applicable to Maryland.2 7
Any consideration of local efforts to absorb specific English statutes into
the body of American written law must be treated in the light of this national
endeavor. It is for this reason that a brief description of the general tendency has prefaced our examination of a neglected passage in American legal
history. Our purpose is modest: to discuss with some care the re-enactment
in New York State of a series of English statutes concerning outlawry, a
process which, in civil cases, has generally been believed never to have
constituted a part of American law. We shall see later how that instance
of legislative reception was related to the work of Samuel Jones and
Richard Varick. Their revision of the laws of New York has never received the detailed attention which it deserves.28 It is hoped that a brief
consideration of one small aspect of their work will not only indicate the
importance of their labors, but will cast light upon the larger process of
statutory reception as a whole.
It is well known that the technicalities of common law pleading put
formidable difficulties in the way of a plaintiff who wished to bring suit
against joint contract debtors, one or more of whom was beyond the reach
of process.- Because the obligation was joint, all debtors must be made
characteristic terms described the same aspect of English statutes, "which, from their

verbosity, their endless tautologies, their involutions of case within case, and parenthesis within parenthesis, and their multiplied efforts at certainty, by saids and afoesaids, by ors and ands, to make them more plain, are really rendered more perplexed
and ircomprehensible, not only to common readers, but to the lawyers themselves".

Supra note 20, at p. 70.
'See the two legislative resolutions (No. 10, Nov. Sess., 1794, and No. 22, Nov. Sess.,
1809) reprinted in an appendix to Volume 7 of

KiLTY, HAISuS AND WATKINS, LAws

OF MARYLAND.

'An annotated edition of Chancellor Kilty's Collection was published in 1870 by J.J.

Alexander.
'No more misleading summary of the provisions of the constitution of 1777 and of
the work of Jones and Varick could well be devised than that of the New York Board
of Statutory Consolidation which, in its report to the legislature in 1908, stated tlat
"the first state constitution of 1777 had been in force but nine years when a revision
of the laws was directed by the legislature. The state was then governed by the common law of England and Great Britain and the acts of the legislature of the colony

of New York, except as abrogated by the constitution of 1777 or modified by the state
legislature. In 1786 Samuel Jones and Richard Varick were appointed to 'collect,
revise and digest' the acts of the colony of New York and the laws of the state passed
since the Revolution".

1 McKINEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAws OF NEw YORK, Annotated,
pp. 1-33 at p. 2. Similarly hasty summaries of the Jones and Varick revision may be

found in BUTLER, THE REVISIo OF THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND
THE RE isERS (1889) p. 5, and in Arnot, The Progress of Law Reform in New York
(1909) 43 AM. L. Rav. 53. Chancellor Kent refers to the "enlightened and chastened
spirit of moderation" which inspired the New York revisions of 1801 and 1829 (for
the former of which he was himself largely responsible), but makes no mention of
the Jones and Varick revision. 1 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 473, note b.
'*2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Williston and Thompson rev. ed. 1936) § 327.
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parties defendant, and all defendants must be brought into court. If the
plaintiff failed to join one of the debtors the promise declared on might be
successfully traversed, or, after the time of Lord Mansfield, the claim would
be dismissed on a plea in abatement. The logic of these technicalities may
well have afforded scholastic satisfaction to judges and lawyers, but the
plaintiff who found himself without remedy because one of his joint debtors
was able to elude the sheriff would find small comfort in the procedural
symmetry of justice. It was imperative, therefore, that some weapon from
the armory of the common law should be given to this plaintiff. Pollock and
Maitland have stated that the weapon which the courts gave to him was "as
clumsy as it was terrible".3 0 That weapon was the process of outlawry.
Although there is no need here to discuss in detail the intricate confusion
to which English courts had, by the 18th century, brought the process of
outlawry, a brief suggestion qf its characteristics is essential for our purposes.3 ' As applied to criminal proceedings its nature is not unfamiliar, at
least in its more romantic aspects. A defendant who had been indicted or
appealed of treason or felony and who eluded capture, or could not be found
within the county where he stood charged, might through outlawry proceedings be put outside the king's peace and beyond his protection. In its
early form the proceeding was instituted by the issuance of a writ of exigent
from the court in which the defendant was appealed or indicted. By that
writ the sheriff of the county was commanded to call the defendant at successive sittings of his county court, and if he did not appear judgment of
outlawry was pronounced against him. The antiquity of the proceedings is
evidenced by the fact that they took place in the ancient county court to
the exclusion of the royal courts.3 2-' There, although founded on the sheriff's
acts, the judgment was entered by the coroners. The effect of the judgment
was to deprive the defendant of substantially all of his civil rights,-his
chattels were forfeited to the King, his lands escheated, and, until the 14th
century, he might on discovery be killed by anyone.
Successive' statutes in the reigns of Henry the Sixth,33 Henry the
Eighth, 84 and Elizabeth 35 gave the defendant somewhat greater assurance
that if outlawry proceedings were instituted he would hear of them. By
'2

POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (1898) 579.
'My summary of the nature of proceedings to outlawry is based primarily upon the
following sources: 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 297 et seq.; VINER's ABRIDGMENT,
Title Outlawry; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1923) 604 et seq.;
Thompson, The Development of the Anglo-American Judicial System. Part I. History
of the English Courts to the Judicature Acts (1932) 17 CORNELL L. Q. 9 ab pp. 12, 13:
TIDD'S PRACTICE, (2nd Am. ed.) 125 et seq.; MORRIS, THE EARLY ENGLISH COUNTY
COURT (1926).

'I HOLDSWORTH

8.
HENRY VI, c. 10,
HENRY VIII, c. 4.
"31 ELIZABETH, c. 3,

'8
'6

Sec. 2.
Sec. 1. See Appendix, infra.
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these statutes it was provided that in addition to the writ of exigent there
should issue a writ of proclamation directing the sheriff of the county where
the defendant resided to make three proclamations ordering his appearance
on pain of outlawry. These proclamations were to be made both in the
sheriff's court and at the door of the local church after Sunday service. The
defendant was also, through a writ of error, allowed to have a judgment of
outlawry reversed. 36 Parliamentary solicitude for the rights of the defendant
in outlawry proceedings was supplemented by the courts. Even such thickskinned officials as the English judges found the unfairness of the proceedings offensive. To allow such severe punishments to be visited upon a
person whose defense was never heard was, after all, out of line with
a growing common law tradition. Such considerations as these led the
courts to protect the rights of outlawed defendants by means of artificial
technicalities. The most minute error in Latin spelling or grammar was
37
enough to invalidate the entire elaborate proceedings.
By the time of Bracton, outlawry had been used in civil actions based
on trespasses vi et armis. A series of statutes extended its application to
all civil cases in which the writ of capias was permitted. The procedural
requirements were substantially the same in civil and criminal proceedings,
and the plaintiff who wished to assert a claim against an absent defendant
would have to pick his way through a mesh of details. When the capias
was returned-non est inventus, an alias writ was issued, and after that was
similarly returned, a pluries was issued. Upon the return of non est inventus
to this writ the plaintiff would obtain his writs of exigent and proclamation,
and these the sheriff would execute as in the criminal proceedings. Finally,
if the defendant did not appear, the county court entered judgment of outlawry against him. In civil cases, of course, the consequences were not as
drastic as in criminal proceedings, for although there was a similar forfeiture,
the judgment did not operate as a conviction for crime.
Terrible and clumsy as these proceedings in many instances may have
been, it is evident that in one situation they served a useful purpose. As
we have seen, persons holding a claim against joint debtors were frequently
unable to make service upon all of the necessary parties defendant, and the
logic of pleading required that the action be abated unless the impossible
'The fictitious character of the whole elaborate procedure and the unreality of the
protection which was afforded the defendant were recognized by Parliament in the
19th century. See 9 HOLDSWORTH 254-256.
'In Markham v. Gargrave, Palm. 121 (1620), infra nominata was misspelt infra
noninata and waviata appeared as wamata in the writ of exigent. These errors were
enough to invalidate the whole proceedings. In Griffith v. Thomas, Style 334 (1652),
it was held that "there is a fault in the outlawry, for in the writ to the sheriff it is
praecipipnusvobis, instead of praecipnus vobis ... Roll, Chief Justice, If the word be
praecipiphius, then there is no command to the sheriff, for that word signifies nothing,
therefore let the outlawry be reversed... ".
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were achieved. It was in such cases that outlawry seemed to justify itself,
for it enabled the plaintiff, by destroying the rights of a joint debtor who
was outside of, or concealed within, the jurisdiction, to sue the others upon
whom service could be made. If the absent co-debtor had been outlawed
a plea in abatement would not lie. The severity of a judgment of outlawry
was very great, but the injury which technical rules of pleading might do a
plaintiff was some justification for its use in proceedings against joint
debtors. It was only when the rules of pleading had been greatly liberalized
that Parliament abolished outlawry proceedings in civil cases.38
This brief account of the characteristics of English proceedings to outlawry will afford an adequate background for the consideration of that
passage in American legal history which is our principal concern. It has
been said that "the process of outlawry in civil cases seems to have been
unknown in the United States"3 9 and that "it appears that outlawry has
never been known on this side of the Atlantic". 40 Such assertions have
ample and distinguished judicial authority behind them. In Harker v.
Brink,41 the Supreme Court of New Jersey had before it for consideration
the so-called Joint Debtor Act of that state. The stattite was derived from
a colonial act of 1771 which, after its preamble reciting that "the proceedings
to outlawry against persons who cannot be taken by process not being in
use in this Colony. . . ", provided a remedy for creditors who held claims
against joint debtors, some of whom were beyond the reach of process.4
The court, in discussing that statute, asserted, with perhaps some local pride
for New Jersey's priority, that "a provision of similar import, and almost
4
identical in phraseology, was enacted in New York as early as 1789". 3
Blessing v. McLinden" was a later New Jersey decision in which the court,
examining further the history of the Joint Debtor Act, again referred to the
colonial act of 1771 and called particular attention to its preamble. The
McLinden case, primarily because of its detailed analysis of the history of
the legislation, has frequently been cited by courts and writers. In part,
at least, because of the quoted preamble from the act of 1771, the local
fact that outlawry was unknown during the colonial period has been gen1
*'42 and 43 VcT., c. 59, Sec. 3 (1879). As to the more recent status of outlawry in

criminal proceedings in England, see Richards, Is Outlawry Obsolete? (1902) 18 LAW

Q. R~v. 297.
'Magruder and Foster, Jurisdiction over Partnerships (1924) 37 HAgv. L. REV. 793,
799.

'"Holdoegel, Jurisdiction over Partnerships, Nonpartnership Associations and Joint
Debtors (1926) 11 IowA L. REv. 193, 197.

"24 N. J. Law 333 (1854).
"ALLINSON,

AcTs OF THE GENERAL AssEmBLY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY,

1702-1776, c. 543.
'Op. cit. supra note 41, at 348. The New York statute referred to is in N. Y. Laws
1788, c. 46.
"81 N. J. Law 379, 79 Atl. 347 (1911).
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eralized into a broad assumption. In Kittredge v. Langley,45 Chief Judge
Cardozo, after citing Blessing v. McLinden, refers to a Rhode Island" and
a Massachusetts 47 decision, and asserts that "the process of outlawry is one
unknown to our law". 48 We have pointed out the fact that the New Jersey
court, in Harker v. Brink, had claimed priority over New York in the
adoption of a joint debtor act. The New York court, by its failure to cite
any earlier New York statute, seems to acknowledge that claim. Undoubtedly the attention of neither court was called to the New York colonial
act of 175649 which provided substantially the same relief against joint
debtors as that which New Jersey adopted fifteen years later.5" But what is
of importance to us-beyond incidentally determining which state may
properly claim the distinction of priority-is the fact that the New York
colonial act was prefaced with precisely the same recital as that which introduced the New Jersey statute. Had the court wanted some authority to
establish the proposition that outlawry was never known in New York, it
might have referred to the recital in the act of 1756 that it was not then
known in the colony. We shall presently see how conclusive that evidence
would have been.
What was it that led the American colonists to repudiate the traditional
procedure of outlawry which, during the 17th and 18th centuries was of
unquestionable importance in English law? Of course no conclusive answer
to that question can be given; the factors which brought about the rejection
of particular elements in English law are multiple and uncertain. In the
case of outlawry, however, our cursory examination of its character may
afford some explanation. Its clumsiness and its severity were noted by
Pollock and Maitland; and American courts, in somewhat more American
terms, have emphasized the same deficiencies. It has been described as
"contrary to the spirit and principles of our government"5 1 and "inconsistent
-252 N. Y. 405, 169 N. E. 626 (1930).

"Nathanson v. Spitz, 19 R. I. 70, 73, 31 Atl. 690 (1895).
' 1Tappan v. Bruen, 5 Mass. 193 (1809).
'"Supra note 45, at 413.
"4 COLONIAL LAws OF N. Y., c. 997.
'The New Jersey act lacked the final proviso of the earlier New York law, which
limited the plaintiff's right of execution to the property jointly owned by all defendants
and the individual property of such defendants as had been served with process. The
New York act stated that the plaintiff, subject to that restriction, might have judgmAent
and execution against "the joint debtors named in the process . . . ". The New Jersey
act of 1771, as printed by Allinson, stated that judgment and execution might be
had against "the joint debtors named -in the proofs . . . ". The New Jersey court in
Ford v. Munson, 1 South. 93 (1818) discussed an amendment of 1797, by which the
word "proofs" was changed to "process", as in the New York law. The court suggested that the change was the result of an error in engrossing the 1797 law. In view
of the fact that the New Jersey act of 1771 was, with the exception of the concluding
proviso, copied verbatim from the New York act of 1756 it seems not unlikely that
the legislative error was made not in 1797 but in 1771.
*'McCall v. Price, 1 McCord (S. C.) 82, 83 (1821).
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with our institutions and repugnant to our constitution and laws . .. ,,2
and "not only dilatory and expensive to plaintiffs, but harsh and oppressive
to nonresident defendants".P Despite the high-sounding considerations thus
emphasized it is not improbable that its inconvenience to plaintiffs was the
principal reason for its repudiation. Although, as we have seen, it possessed
some justification when applied to claims against absent joint debtors, the
joint debtor acts and other procedural devices seemed to destroy whatever
claim to utility it possessed.
In view, of the more or less frequent dicta that outlawry was alien to
American traditions and of the express recital in the preambles of the colonial acts of 1756 and 1771, it is, perhaps, not surprising that writers and
judges have recently assumed that outlawry was never known in the United
States. The New York constitution of 1777, by its cautious provision for
the selective reception of English law, seemed to provide a sanction for the
permanent repudiation of practices such as outlawry which are "inconsistent
with our institutions". The development of legal practices is not, however,
as simple as we could sometimes wish. In 1787 the legislature of New York
adopted an elaborate statute making detailed provision for outlawry proceedings in civil and criminal cases. 54 Because the law, with minor changes,
was in effect for some forty-three years65 it is manifestly inaccurate to say
that, outlawry as an incident of civil process was never known in this
country.56
In an appendix to this article are printed Chapter Nine of the Laws of
New York of 1787 and the various English statutes upon which that act
was apparently based. No useful purpose would be served by making a
detailed examination of the various similarities between the American and
British legislation,-the resemblances are evident without specific emphasis.
Our primary concern is not to discuss the details of practice outlined in the
New York act but to consider how the legislature came to adopt the statute. In view of the condemnation which proceedings to outlawry have
commonly received from American courts, it is desirable to determine why
the legislature of a recently rebellious colony, presumably anxious to rid
'Dale County v. Gunter, 46 Ala. 118, 140 (1871).
'Harker v. Brink, supra note 41, at 351.
'N. Y. Laws 1787, c. 9.
'The statute was repealed by Ch. 21, Sec. 1, Para. 57, Laws of N. Y. 1828, the repeal
to be effective in 1830. In 1801 the act had been amended in small respects. See Laws
of New York 1801, c. 51, and appendix, infra.
'Several Virginia statutes indicate that outlawry in civil proceedings was for a time
in force in that colony. See acts of Feb. 27, 1752 and Dec. 22, 1788, in 6 HENING 3F34
and 12 HENING 730, 736. See also Moss v. Moss's Administrator, 4 Hening and
Munf. 293 (1809). Outlawry in criminal cases was recognized in Virginia after the
Revolution. See Commonwealth v. Hale, 2 Va. Cas. 241 (1821); Commonwealth v.
Haggerman, ibid. p. 244; Commonwealth v.,Anderson, ibid. p. 245. British proceedings
to outlawry in civil cases seem to have been adopted in no statutory revision.
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itself of a cumbersome and confused inheritance, saw fit to adopt the
elaborate and medieval process of outlawry. Were there no conflicting evidence it could be most persuasively argued that the outlawry statute was
unrelated to the work of Jones and Varick. It will be remembered that in
1786 they were directed by the legislature to "collect and reduce into proper
form ... and lay" before the legislature for enactment such English statutes
"as have been generally supposed to extend to the late Colony". In the
preamble to the Joint Debtor Act of 1756, it was recited that the proceeding
to outlawry against persons who cannot be taken by process was not in
use in the colony. That act was still in force in 1772, for in that year Peter
Van Schaack was directed by the legislature to publish a collection of
colonial laws then in force,5 and in his volume, published in the following
year, the Joint Debtor Act was printed in full, with its preamble. s Furthermore, in a statute passed on March 9, 1774, it was stated that certain "disorderly Practices are highly Criminal and . . . it is indisputably necessary
for want of Process to Outlawry (which is not used in this Colony) that
special provision be made for bringing such offenders in future to
trial .... ,,1 Certainly these legislative recitals indicate that the process of
outlawry was unknown in New York during the colonial period. s0 The
possibility that at some time between March, 1774, and April, 1775, the
elaborate proceedings were adopted by the colony and left no trace in local
records is so remote as to be negligible. If English statutes concerning putlawry were not in force in New York when the revolution commenced, then
Jones and Varick had not been directed to. submit them to the legislature
for re-enactment.
This is the logic of the argument which might be urged to deny that the
act of 1787 was related to the work of Jones and Varick. Logic, however,
cannot refute the testimony of contemporary records. In the Journal of
the New York Assembly for January 13, 1787, appears the following entry:
"Mr. Jones, pursuant to the law for revising the laws of this State, laid
before the House the following bills, viz., ... A bill entitled An act declaring
what process may be issued in certain Personal Actions, and for regulating
"5 COLONAL LAWS OF N. Y. Ch. 1543, p. ,355.
"LAws OF N. Y., 1691-1772, p. 352. This colonial joint debtor act was re-enacted
almost verbatim by Sec. 23 of Chapter 46 of the Laws of 1788. Shortly afterward the
criminal act was repealed. N. Y. Laws 1788, Ch. 73, Sec. 1.
'15 COLONI&L LAws OF N. Y. Ch. 1660. See also the recital in a special act for
outlawing Phillip French and Thomas Wenham passed on April 30, 1702. It was
there stated that "the want of Process of outlawry in Criminal and Civil Causes is a
manifest defect in the Execucon of the Law within this Province". 1 CoLoNIAL LAWs
oF N. Y. Ch. 105.
'For one case in which the Court of Quarter Sessions of New York City seems to
have outlawed a defendant in criminal proceedings, see Queen v. Rideout (1708), reprinted in GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMTENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

(1937) pp. 403-404.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

570

Outlawries . . . -.61 On that day the bill was read for the first time and
63
ordered to a second reading.6 2 Two days later the second reading occurred,
and on the 25th the engrossed bill was read a third time in the Assembly.64
On January 27, the Senate resolved that the bill should pass without amendment. 65 On February 5, in the Assembly, "a message from the Honorable
the Council of Revision, was delivered by the Honorable Mr. Chief Justice
Morris, that it does not appear improper to the Council, that the bill entitled,
An act declaring what process miay be issued in certain Personal Actions,
and for regdating Outlawries . . . [and other named bills] should respec-

tively become laws of this State". 66 And thus the statute concerning outlawry was adopted as part of the law of New York.
My purpose, as I have said, is not to discuss the details of the statute, as
they relate either to criminal or civil proceedings. Some consideration of
the imitative and creative aspects of the law will, however, reveal the character of the work of Jones and Varick. The first and second sections, though
not directly traceable to parliamentary acts, contain a brief statement of
the existent English law as summarized by Coke, Blackstone, and Viner. In
many ways the second section is the most interesting. There was no English
statute conferring jurisdiction in outlawry proceedings upon the County
Courts, for the obvious reason that their jurisdiction in such cases was
pre-Norman in origin. It will be remembered that the ancient County Courts
derived from the shire moots presided over by the sheriffs, and that although
their jurisdiction was frequently confirmed by Parliament and the king, in
origin it was independent of both. The New York Constitution of 1777 had
referred to the courts of common pleas and of general sessions as county
courts, 67 and it has been suggested that they may have had some connection

historically with the ancient county courts of England. 68 If that connection
had been recognized it would have been simple and natural for the legislature in 1787 to give the common pleas and general sessions jurisdiction to
conduct outlawry proceedings. Instead, the second section of the act provided that the sheriff of each ounty, or his deputy, should on the first and
third Monday of every month, hold a court to be known as his County
Court. Here, as in England, he was to demand persons on the exigents and
'JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF N. Y., 10th Session, 1787, p. 5. At
that time Samuel Jones was a member and Richard Varick the speaker of the assembly,
ibid.
p. 3, 4.
6Ibid.

'Ibid. p. 8.
"Ibid. p. 22.
'JOURNAL

OF THE SENATE OF

N. Y., 10th session, 1787, p. 15.

6Op. cit., supra note 59, at p. 36.
'See Articles 24, 25 and 28 of Constitution of 1777. See also People v. Albany Common Pleas, 19 Wend. 27 (1837).
"RADIN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1937), p. 174.
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pronounce judgment of outlawry against those who did not appear. In one
respect only was the practice of this court to differ from that followed in
England; the sheriff himself might pronounce judgment. That act need not,
as in England, be performed by the coroners. The striking fact, therefore,
about the second section of Chapter Nine is its imitative adoption of British
procedure; although one would expect that Jones and Varick and the legislature would, if outlawry were to be adopted, have fitted it into the existing
judicial machinery of the state, instead, they transplanted to American
soil the English tribunals which traditionally had exercised jurisdiction in
such proceedings, and did so despite the fact that these ancient courts performed no other function in the new society.
Each section of the act from the third through the seventh re-enacts almost verbatim various English statutes from the time of Edward I to that of
William and Mary. If Jones and Varick, in submitting the statute to the
legislature for enactment, went farther than they had been told to go, they
did far less than had been requested in the way of altering the British "stile
and language" which had been declared by the legislature to be "improper
to appear in the statute books of this State". There was, to be sure, a certain
amount of creative enactment in the statute; the last two sections evidence
a marked departure from English practice. The provisions for jury trial of
the issue of damages were probably unknown in English outlawry proceedings, as were those stating that the satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim would
render the judgment of outlawry totally inoperative.
In endeavoring to understand why the legislature deemed it desirable to
provide for such process in civil actions it is important to remember that the
extent of relief which could be obtained under the Joint Debtor Act was
very limited. It was useful only when one or more of the joint debtors
could be served with process. Moreover, execution could be had only against
property jointly owned and the individual property of the defendants who
were brought into court. The process of outlawry, on the other hand, would
permit recovery against any debtor, who could not be served, whether he
was jointly indebted or not, and, as provided for in New York, it apparently permitted the satisfaction of the claim out of the individual property
of the absent defendant. There were certainly theoretical advantages in
the process of outlawry which relief under the Joint Debtor Act would not
afford, and the elimination of the severe forfeitures which in England accompanied outlawry even in civil actions, made its unfairness to defendants
much less real than under British practice. Although against an absconding
or concealed debtor, solely indebted, the creditor might obtain relief by
proceedings quasi in rem,9 the intricacies of the procedure were such that
'Act of April 3, 1775, 5 CoLOIAL LAws oF N. Y. 807 (Ch. 1731). This statute was
re-enacted on April 14, 1786; see Laws of N. Y. 1786, c. 24.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
creditors might well prefer some alternative remedy-a process which would
obviate the necessity of an attachment being made in the first instance. Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that Jones and Varick felt that it would
be desirable to make provision for the broader remedy, and in view of the
peculiar safeguards afforded the defendant, it may not be strange that the
vigilant Council of Revision allowed the statute, without questioning, to
become law.
During the years when the statute was in force there were only occasional judicial references to its provisions. Three reports in Coleman and
Caines' Cases indicate that the courts were aware of the possibility of a
plaintiff proceeding to outlawry against an absent defendant°--one indicating that it might be used in circumstances also covered by the Joint Debtor
.Act.71 The only detailed discussion of its character that has been found is
in Roosevelt v. W. & L. Crommelin,72 a case in which it was held to be
applicable to proceedings against residents of Mississippi for the enforcement of rights in a bill of exchange drawn by the defendants in Mississippi.
It is to be hoped that some day sheriffs' records may be discovered which
will cast more light on the details of the procedure in both civil and criminal
cases than is given by the bare provisions of the statute itself. John A.
Dunlap, in his Treatise on the Practice of the Supreme Court of New York,
published in 1821, discusses the local statute in some detail, but indicates
that it was seldom used. 73 Its repeal in 1828, effective in 1830, was due
apparently to a characteristically American combination of practical and
theoretical considerations. The report of the statutory revisers submitted to
the legislature in 1828 stated that the proceeding to outlawry "is so tedious
and expensive, that it has become obsolete, or if resorted to, it must be for
purposes inconsistent with justice". 74
The provisions of the New York statute may well be deserving of more
detailed consideration that I have given them. A reading of the statute and
a comparison of its provisions with those of the English acts will suggest
many questions which I have neither touched upon nor answered. I believe,
however, that the simple facts established in this study are of some significance. We have seen that outlawry was an unknown process in the colonial
period of New York's legal history, and we have determined that Samuel
Jones and Richard Varick, going beyond the obligations imposed upon them
'Heyers v. Dening, Coleman and Caines' Cases 75 (1799) ; Jackson v. Cooper, ibid.
at 154 (1803) ; Shaw et al. v. Colfax et a., ibid. at p. 450 (1805).
'Shaw et aL v. Colfax et al., supra note 70.
'18 John. Rep. 253 (1820).
"Volume 1, p. 138 et seq. The process as used in New York is also briefly discussed
in 1 BAc Kus, DIGEST oF LAWS RELATING TO SHERIFFS (1812) 111.
"N. Y. Revised Statutes, Reports of the Revisers, Benjamin F. Butler, John Duer
and John C. Spencer, 1826-1828, Part III, Ch. VI, Title VI, Article Second, Sec. 7,
p. 56.
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in 1786, submitted to the legislature an elaborate statute making provision
for that imported remedy. Their suggestion, combining imitative and creative elements, was found acceptable by the legislature and the Council of
Revision and was adopted as a part of the law of New York. 75 This neglected
instance of selective reception is of far more than local significance, and I
suspect that when a detailed and comparative study of other similar efforts
is made the broader relevance will be self-evident. It does not seem improbable that other post-revolutionary revisers may also have endeavored,
under the guise of re-enactment, to achieve what a Marxist might term a
counter-revolution in our law. The fact that the ancient remedy was too
novel for Americans also possesses its historical importance. The erstwhile
rebels, led by Jones and Varick, had turned to England for guidance. In
1828 the British remedy was found to be unwieldy, extravagant and unfair.
Accordingly, they abandoned the imported process and relied upon the
sufficiency of the remedies which Yankee ingenuity could provide. "It required time and experience to ascertain how much of the English law would
be suitable to this country." 76 Jones and Varick endeavored to set aside the
verdict of experience, but time proved their effort to have been in vain.

APPENDIX
LAws OF NEw YORK 1787'
Chapter 9
AN ACT [declaring what process
may be issued in certain personal actions,
and] for regulating outlawries.
I. Be it enacted by the People of the
State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, [and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same],
That in all actions of account, debt, detinue, annuity, covenant, conspiracy and
of the case, and in all actions of replevin,
after a capias in withernam is returned
that the person against whom it is issued
has no goods, the like process may [hereafter] be had [and used] as in actions of
trespass, done with force and arms, and
in these as well as in all other cases
"In the skitch of Samuel Jones in the Dictionary of American Biography (supra,
note 12), the author quotes a passage from the New York Legal Observer for October
1853, in which Jones was described: "His learning was vast. His principles . . . were
ultra-conservative. . . . He was the man above all others to adapt the system of laws
to the new condition of things, . . . and on every subject of that description the Legislature followed him implicitly, while upon any subject connected with politics, they
were sure to be on the other side, with entire unanimity."
"Tilghman, C. J., in Guardians of the Poor v. Greene, 5 Binney (Pa.) 554, 558 (1813).
'Words in brackets were removed and words in italics were added by the amendment
of 1801. See N. Y. Laws 1801, ch. 51.
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where process issues for taking the body,
if it be returned that the person against
whom such process issued is not found,
such process may be pursued to the exigent, and outlawry thereupon.
II. And be it further enacted [by the
authority aforesaid], That [each and]
every sheriff shall [respectively] in his
county hold a court either in person or by
his sufficient deputy, on [every] the first
and third Monday in every month, -in
case any process shall require it, at the
court house in his county to be called his
county court, for the purpose of demanding persons upon exigents, and pronouncing outlawries thereupon; and [that it
shall not be necessary for the coroners
of the county, or any of them, to attend
at such court, or to give judgment of
outlawry] ; [but] it shall be sufficient for
the sheriff or his deputy to give the
judgment of outlawry, and to return the
same upon the exigent, without saying
by the judgment of the coroners.
III. And be it further enacted [by the
authority aforesaid], That in every original writ of actions personal, and in all
[appeals], indictments and informations
[and] in which the exigent shall be
awarded to the names of the defendants,
in such writs [original], [appeals], indictments and informations, additions
shall be made of their estate or degree
or mystery, and of the towns [or places]
and counties of [which .they were or be,
or in] which they be or were conversant;
and if by process upon the said [original]
writs, [appeal], indictments or informations, in which the said additions be
omitted,, any outlawries be pronounced
they shall be void, [frustrate and holden
for none] ; and [that] before any outlawries pronounced, the said writs, [appeals], indictments and informations in
which such additions shall be omitted,
shall be abated by the exception of [the]
party [where in the same, the said additions be omitted] ; provided always, that
although the said writs [of actions personal), be not according to the records
and deeds by the surplusage of the additions aforesaid, they shall not be abated
for that cause.
IV. And be it further enacted [by the
authority aforesaid], That no person
charged as accessary in any indictment
[or appeal] shall be outlawed, until the
principal be attainted; But such indictment[s] [and appeals] may be nevertheless prosecuted; [but] and the exigent
against the accessary shall remain until
the principal be attainted by outlawry or
otherwise.

1

V, C. 5 (1413)
Also, it is ordained and established,
That in every original writ of actions
personal, and appeals, and indictments, in
which exigent shall be awarded, that to
the names of the defendants in such writs
original, appeals and indictments, addition shall be made of their estate or
degree, or trade, and of the towns, or
hamlets, or places, and the counties of
the Which they were, or are, or in which
they are or were or may be conversant:
And if by Process upon the said original
writs, appeals, or indictments, in the
which the said additions be omitted, any
outlawries be pronounced, that they be
void, frustrate, and holden for none; and
that before the outlawries pronounced,
the said writs and indictments shall be
abated by exception of the party, for
that the said additions be therein omitted.
Provided always, That although the said
writs of actions personal be not according to records or deeds, by the surplusage
of the additions aforesaid, that for that
cause they be not abated. ...

3

HENRY

C. 14 (1275)
And forasmuch as it hath been used in
some counties to outlaw persons being appealed of commandment, force, aid or
receipt, within the same time that he
which is appealed for the deed is outlawed; it is provided and [commanded]
by the King, That none be outlawed
upon appeal of commandment, force, aid,
or receipt, until he that is appealed of
EDWARD I,
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V. And, be it further enacted [by- the
authority aforesaid], That after any person [is or] shall be indicted [or appealed] of treason [or felony], it shall be
commanded to the sheriff to take the
body of the person so indicted [or appealed by a writ of precept called a
capias], and if the sheriff return on the
[same] writ [or precept], that the body
is not found, another writ [or precept]
of capias shall be immediately made returnable at a certain day, not less than
three months after the date of the same
writ; and in the same writ shall be comprised, that the sheriff shall cause the
goods and chattels of the person indicted [or appealed] to be seised, and
safely kept until the day of the return
of the writ [or precept] ; and if the sheriff return that the body is not found,
and the person indicted [or appealed
cometh not] shall not appear, the exigent shall be awarded, and the goods and
chattels so seised shall be forfeited to the
people of- this State. But if the person
indicted [or appealed come and yield
himself] appear, or be taken by the sheriff or other officer before the return of
the second [capias] writ, then the goods
and chattels shall be saved.
VI. And be it further enacted [by the
authority aforesaid], That upon every
indictment [and appeal] against any citizen of this State dwelling in [other
counties] any other county than where
such indictment [or appeal is or] shall
be taken, of any treason [or felony] after
the first writ [of capias] returned, another W'
rit [of capias] shall be awarded
directed to the sheriff of the county
where the person indicted [or appealed]
is or shall be supposed to be conversant
by the same indictment [or appeal] returnable in the same court [or before
the same justices] before whom the indictment [or appeal is or] shall be taken,
at a certain day, not less than three
months after the date of the same writ;
by which [writ] the sheriff shall be commanded to take the body of the person
so indicted [or appealed] if he or she
shall be found in his [bailiwic] county,

the deed be attainted, so that one like law
be used therein through the realm; nevertheless he that will appeal shall not, by
reason of this, intermit or cease to commence his appeal at the next county
against them, as well as against them
which be appealed of the deed; but
their exigent shall remain, until such as
be appealed of the deed be attainted by
outlawry, or otherwise.
25 EDWARD III, St. 5, Chapter 14 (1350-2)
Also it is accorded and assented, that
after any man is indicted of felony before
the justices in their sessions of Oyer and
Terminer, it shall be commanded to the
sheriff to attach his body by a writ or by
precept which is called a capias; and
if the sheriff return on the same writ or
precept, that the body is not found, another writ or precept of capias shall be
incontently made, returnable at three
weeks after; and in the same writ or
precept it shall be comprised, that the
sheriff shall cause his chattels to be seized
and safely kept till the day of the return
of the writ or precept; and if the sheriff
return that the body is not found, and
the indictee cometh not, the exigend shall
be awarded, and the chattels shall be
forfeit, as the law of the crown ordaineth;
but if he come and yield himself, or be
taken by the sheriff, or by, other officer
before the return of the second capias,
then the goods and chattels shall be saved.

8 HENY VI, C. 10, Sec. 2 (1429)
That upon every indictment or appeal
by the which any of the said lieges dwelling in other counties than there where
such indictment or appeal is or shall be
taken of treason, felony, and trespass, to
be taken thereafter before Justices of
Peace, or before any other having power
to take such indictments or appeals, or
other commissioners or justices in any
County, Franchise, or Liberty of England,
before any exigent awarded upon any
indictment or appeal in the form aforesaid to be taken, that presently after the
first writ of capias upon every such indictment or appeal awarded and returned,
that another writ of capias shall be
awarded, directed to the -sheriff of the
county, whereof he which is so indicted js
or was supposed to be conversant by the
same indictment, returnable before the
same justices or commissioners before
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and if he or she shall not be found in his
[bailiwic] county [that] the [said)
sheriff shall make proclamation in two
of his county courts before the return of the same writ, that the
person so indicted [or appealed shall]
appear at the said court [or before the
said justices where he or she is or shall
be indicted or appealed] at the day of
the return of the same writ, to answer
to the people of [the State of New York
or the party] this State, of the treason
[felony or trespass], whereof he or "she
[is or] shall be so indicted [or appealed],
and after such writ [of capias] so served
and returned, if [he or she] the person
so indicted [or appealed] come not at
the day of the return of the [same] writ
[of capias] the exigent shall be awarded
against such person [so indicted or appealed].

whom he is indicted or appealed at a
certain day, containing the space of three
months from the date of the said last writ,
where the county courts be holden from
month to month, and where the county
courts be holden from six weeks to six
weeks, it shall have the space of four
months until the day of the return of
the same writ, by which writ of second
capias, be it contained and commanded to
the same sheriff to take him which is so
indicted or appealed by his body if he
can be found within his bailiwic, and if
he cannot be found within his bailiwic
that the said sheriff shall make proclamation in two county courts before the return of the same writ, that he which is
so indicted or appealed shall appear before the said justices or commissioners

in the County, Liberty, or Franchise
where he is indicted or appealed, at the
day contained in the said last writ of
capias, to answer to our said Lord the

King, and to the Party, of the felony,
treason or trespass, whereof he is so indicted or appealed.; after which second

writ of capias so served and returned, if
he which is so indicted or appealed come

And where any such indictment Lor
appeal is or] shall be taken before [justices assigned to hear and determine, or
before justices of the peace, or before]
any other court or offlcer having [power]
authority to take [such indictments or
appials] the same, and [shall] be removed [or delivered] into the supreme
court [by certiorari or otherwise], no
exigent shall be awarded by the [same]
supreme court until such writ [of capias]
with proclamation [shall] be awarded
and served and returned as aforesaid.

And, if any exigent [shall] be
awarded [upon any such indictment or
appeal] before such [capias] writ with
proclamation be awarded, served and returned as aforesaid, and outlawry be
[upon that] thereupon pronounced, [as
well] the exigent [so awarded] and [the]
outlawry [thereupon, and every of them]
shall be [holden for none and] void; [and
the party against whom such exigent shall

not at the day of the same writ of
capias returned, the exigent shall be
awarded against such persons indicted
or appealed, and every of them.
10 HENRY VI, C. 6 (1432)
That if any such indictments taken, or
to be taken, before any Justice of
Peace or before any other having power
to take such indictments or appeals,
or other justices or commissioners in any
county, franchise or liberty of England,
shall be removed lSefore the King on his
Bench or elsewhere, by certiorari or
otherwise, that then after such removing,
before any exigent awaraed upon any
such indictment or appeal in the form
aforesaid taken, or to be taken, that presently after the first writ of capias upon
every such indictment or appeal, awarded
and returned, that another writ of capias
be awarded, directed to the sheriff of
the county where he that is so indicted
or appealed is of or was supposed to be
conversant. ...
8 HENRY VI, C. 10, Sec. 3 (1429)
And if any exigent hereafter be awarded upon any such indictment or appeal
against the form aforesaid or any outlawry be thereupon pronounced, as well
such exigent so awarded as the outlawry
thereupon pronounced, and every of
them, shall be holden for null and void,
and that the party against whom such
exigent contrary to the form aforesaid-is
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be awarded or outlawry pronounced, contrary to the form aforesaid, shall not be
endamaged thereby, nor put to loss of his
or her life, or goods or chattels, lands
or tenements].
VII. And be it further enacted [by
the authority aforesaid], That in every
action personal, and in all cases of indictments and informations for trespasses or misdemeanors, wherein [or
whereupon] any writ of exigent shall be
awarded out of any court, one writ of
proclamation shall be awarded [and
made] out of the same court, having the
like [day of] test and return as the said
writ of exigent [shall have] directed [and
delivered of record] to the sheriff of the
county where the defendant at the time of
the exigent so awarded shall be dwelling, which writ of proclamation shall
contain the effect of the [same] action,
indictment or information. And [the]
such sheriff [of the county unt- whom
any such writ of proclamation shall be
directed] shall [make or] cause to be
made three proclamations in the form
following, that is to say, one of the same
proclamations in his open county court,
and one other [of the same proclamations] at the general sessions of the
peace [in those parts] where.the [party]
defendant at the time of the exigent
awarded shall be dwelling, and one other
[of the same proclamations] one month
at least before the fifth demand by virtue
of said writ of exigent at or near [to]
the most usual door of the church of the
town [or place] where the defendant shall
[be dwelling] reside at the time of
awarding the said exigent; and if there
be more than one church in such town,
then at or near the most usual door of
the church nearest the'defendant's dwelling, and if there be no church in such
town, then at or near the most usual door
of the church in the next town nearest the
defendant's dwelling, and upon a Sunday
immediately after divine service [and sermon] if any there be. And if any such
defendant shall at the time of awarding
the exigent, reside out of this State, then
such writ of proclamation shall be directed to and executed by the sheriff to whom
the exigent shall be directed; and in
such case such writ of proclamation shall
be published in one or more of the newspapers to be printed in the city of New
York for twelve [several] weeks before
the return of the exigent. And [that] all
outlawries [had and] pronounced [and
no] without writs of proclamations
awarded and returned according to the

awarded, or outlawry pronounced, be not
endamaged nor put to loss of his goods,
or chattels, land or tenements, nor of
his life.
31 ELIZABETH, C. 3, Sec. 1 (1509)
That in every action personal wherein
any writ of exigent shall be awarded out
of any court, in or after the term of
Easter next coming, one writ of proclamation shall be awarded and made out
of the same court having day of teste,
and return as the said writ of exigent
shall have, directed and delivered of record to the sheriff of the county whiere
the defendant at the time of the exigent
so awarded shall be dwelling; which writ
of proclamation shall contain the effect
of the same actions: and the sheriff of
the county unto whom any such writ of
proclamation shall be directed, shall make
three proclamations in this form following, and not otherwise; that is to say, one
of the same proclamations in the open
county court, and one other of the same
proclamations to be made at the general
Quarter-Sessions of the Peace, in those
parts where the party defendant at the
time of the exigent awarded shall be
dwelling, and one othe" of the same proclamations to be made one month at
least before the Quint. Exact. by virtue
of the said writ of exigent, at or near
to the most usual door of the Church or
Chapel of that town or parish where the
defendant shall be dwelling at the time
of the said exigent so awarded; and if
the defendant shall be dwelling out of
any parish, then in such place as aforesaid of the parish, in the same county, and
next adjoining to the place of the defetiddant's dwelling; and upon a Sunday immediately after Divine Service: And that
all outlawries had and pronounced after
the end of the next Easter term, and no
writs of proclamations awarded and returned according to the form of this Statute, shall be utterly void and of none
effect. . ..
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form of this statute, shall be [utterly]
void [and of none effect], and may be
avoided by averment, without suing out
any writ of error.
VIII. And be it further enacted [by
the authority aforesaid], That before any
reversal of any outlawry be had [by plea
or otherwise] and before any allowance of
any writ in error upon any outlawry, the
defendant [and defendants] in the original
action [or suit] shall put in bail, if bail
was required in such [original] action [or
suit], not only to appear and answer to
the plaintiff in the former suit in a new
action to be commenced by the said plaintiff for the cause mentioned in the first
action, but also to satisfy the condemnation, if the plaintiff shall begin such suit
before the end of two terms next after
the allowing of the writ of error, or
otherwise avoiding of the said outlawry.
IX. And be it further enacted [by
the authority aforesaid], That no person
[or persons whomsoever] who [are or]
shall be outlawed in any court, for any
cause, [matter or thing] whatsoever,
other than for treason or felony, shall be
compelled [to come in person into] personally to appear in court [or appear in
person in court] to reverse such outlawry,
but [shall or] may appear by attorney
and reverse such outlawry, without bail in
all cases, except where special bail shall
be ordered by the court.
X. And be it further enacted [by the
authority aforesaid], That in all cases
where an outlawry shall be had before
judgment in any personal action, the
plaintiff [at whose suit the same outlawry
shall be had] may suggest and set forth
his cause of action upon the roll of the
exigent after the return of the same,
upon which a writ shall [be issued]
issue to the sheriff of the county where
the action shall be brought, to summon a
jury to appear in the [same] court where
the action shall be brought, if the same
shall be brought in any other court than
the supreme court; and if the [same]
action [shall] be brought in the supreme
court, then before the [justices or] justice
of the supreme court at the next circuit court to be held in the county where
such action shall be brought, to inquire
into the truth of the matters charged by
the plaintiff, and to assess the damages
that the plaintiff shall have sustained
thereby. And if the action shall be in
the supreme court it shall be commanded
in the same writ to the [justices or]
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That before any allowance of any writ
of error, or reversing of any outlawry
be had by plea or otherwise, through or
by want of any proclamation to be had
or made according to the form of this
Statute, after the end of Easter term
next, the defendant and defendants in the
original action shall put in bail, not only
to appear and answer to the plaintiff in
the former suit, in a new action to be
commenced by the said plaintiff for the
cause mentioned in the first action, but
also to satisfy the condemnation, if the
plaintiff shall begin his suit, before the
end of two terms next after the allowing
the writ of error or otherwise avoiding
of the said outlawry.
4 and 5 WILLIAM AND MARY, C. 18, Sec.
3 (1692)
That from and after the first day of
Easter term no person or persons whatsoever, who are or. shall be outlawed in
the said court for any cause, matter or
thing whatsoever, (treason and felony
only excepted) shall be compelled to
come in person into, or appear in person
in the said court, to reverse such outlawry, but shall or may appear by attorney, and reverse the same without
bail, in all cases, except where special
bail shall be ordered by the said court.
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justice who shall hold such circuit court,
that he [or they shall] make a return
thereof to the supreme court, at the time
in such writ mentioned and upon the return of such writ if the action shall be
in the supreme court, or upon the execution of such writ, if the action shall be
in any other court, execution shall be
awarded for the sum found by the jury,
with costs, both upon the outlawry and
prosecution of the said inquiry. And further, that upon the execution of every
such writ of inquiry the plaintiff shall
prove his cause of action and [debt or]
damages, in the same manner as if the
defendant had appeared, and traversed the
same.
XI. And be it further enacted [by the
authority aforesaid], That upon the payment of the sum so found upon such inquiry [as aforesaid] with costs [as aforesaid] or where any outlawry shall be had
after judgment in any personal action,
upon payment of the debt or damages and
costs adjudged or upon the same being
levied by [any] execution, [or brought
into court by the defendant], such out-'
lawry and judgment shall be considered
as satisfied, and shall cease to have any
further or other operation; and an entry
shall in such case be made on the roll of
the exigent after the return of the same,
and after the execution or return of the
inquiry, where such inquiry [as aforesaid]
shall be made, that the debt or damages
and costs are paid or levied, [or brought
into court], and [that the] defendant as
to the outlawry, [or] and any judgment
[and outlawry], and [all] execution thereupon, shall go without day. And further
that no outlawry in any personal action
shall work any disability or forfeiture
whatsoever in favour of any other person,
than the plaintiff at whose suit it shall be
had.
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